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PETER JONKERS & MARCEL SAROT 
Tilburg University 
 
This collection of papers is derived from the nineteenth biannual con-
ference of the European Society for Philosophy of Religion, held in the ‘Kon-
takt der Kontinenten’ in Soesterberg, the Netherlands, from 30 August to 2 
September 2012, which was sponsored by the School of Catholic Theology of 
Tilburg University and the Department of Religious Studies and Theology of 
Utrecht University. The conference brought together some eighty philoso-
phers of religion and researchers from related disciplines, most of them com-
ing from one of the four founding regions of the ESPR, viz. the English speak-
ing region, the North-European region, the German speaking and the Dutch 
speaking region. Because of the excellent reputation of these conferences 
over the years, scholars from Eastern and Southern Europe, and even from 
some non-European countries also participated, thereby enlivening and 
broadening the discussions about the conference theme. As usual at ESPR 
conferences, the 2012 conference theme was so chosen that it lent itself to 
both analytical and continental approaches and to the conversation between 
the two.  Moreover, the study of ‘embodied religion’ – for this was the theme 
– cannot take place in isolation, but needs the input from various other disci-
plines. This is reflected in the current volume. 
The study of religion is often marred by a mentalistic bias. Religion is 
then interpreted as primarily belonging to the sphere of the spiritual. While 
it is true that for most religious traditions (Christian as well as non-Christian) 
God is a spiritual and disembodied being, even the presence of God is always 
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a mediated presence, and it may well be argued that this mediation is always 
material in character.1 It is one-sided to approach religion through the study 
of convictions, concepts, values and arguments only. Religions are also typi-
cally very down to earth, dealing with issues of sexuality, reproduction and 
family, with practices about food, offering and sacrifice, questions of birth 
and death etc. Hence the human body is always involved in the concepts and 
practices of religions. Furthermore religions also express themselves in vari-
ous material ways, such as in icons and (other) works of art, in prayers, songs 
and the liturgy, which all have a strong physical component, in the inscrip-
tion of the religious in the human body (e.g. the sacraments, the ritual of cir-
cumcision, and stigmata), and last but not least in a religiously inspired dis-
ciplining of the human body. Thus, even spirituality is often embodied.2 
The idea that religion is something purely spiritual is challenged in a dif-
ferent way as well, namely by recent developments in neuroscience. The find-
ings of neuroscience challenge philosophy of religion to rethink those charac-
teristics of human nature that are vital for religion, such as free will, altruism, 
morality, and last but not least the human person as a ‘self.’ Some of the more 
extreme forms of neuroscience go as far as to suggest that a complete material 
explanation of human nature is in sight, thus annihilating, together with the 
spiritual dimension of the human person, the spiritual dimension of religion. 
In order to have a fruitful discussion between philosophy of religion and neu-
roscience it is imperative to avoid such a reductionism. But, at the same time, 
it is clear that neuroscientific research sheds an intriguing light on the ques-
tion what it means when people call themselves religious. 
This gives ample support for the two underlying theses of the contribu-
tions to this conference volume. First, that religion is always embodied in var-
ious ways:  on the level of God’s presence in humans, on that of the multitude 
of ways in which people express their religiosity, and on that of the neurologi-
cal processes that accompany religious feelings and attitudes. Second, that 
major changes in the basic anthropological concepts regarding the human 
body inevitably have an impact upon religion, and thus also challenge philos-
ophy of religion to rethink how religions are embodied in the human person.  
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Birgit Meyer, Mediation and the Genesis of Presence: Towards a Material Approach to 
Religion (Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012), 8–9. 
2
 See, e.g., Willem Marie Speelman, God aan den lijve ondervinden: Lichamelijke spiritualiteit vol-
gens Franciscus en Clara (Leeuwarden: Discovery Books, 2012). 
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The papers included in this volume highlight the complexity of the con-
ference-theme as well as the variety of philosophical perspectives that are 
taken in order to understand the phenomenon of embodied religion.  They 
differ in style, method and in their ways to relate to culture and science. To 
give an example, it was in the wake of the rise of phenomenology and its con-
cept of the ‘body as subject’ that theological anthropology and (continental) 
philosophy of religion started to pay systematic attention to the impact of re-
ligion on the human body in general and to various shapes of religious em-
bodiment in particular. Similarly, analytic philosophy has always been strong 
in examining the effects of scientific discoveries on the traditional idea of the 
human person as a free, morally responsible, spiritual being. One of the goals 
of the conference was to foster a dialogue between these approaches, resulting 
in a better view of the promising perspectives, concepts and arguments that 
philosophy of religion can use in order answer the questions raised by the new 
developments in our understanding of human nature.  
This volume starts with the keynote address by Ola Sigurdson, in which 
he discusses different perspectives on (religious) embodiment, particularly 
stemming from (the history of) culture and modern medicine. Sigurdson ex-
plains that, because of the current hegemony of medicine (including neuro-
science), the personal as well as the social dimension of religious embodiment 
is lost out of sight. Hence, he stresses the need of a non-reductive approach of 
religious embodiment, which is exactly what the contributions to this volume, 
taken together, try to achieve. 
In order to structure the great variety of perspectives on embodied relig-
ion somewhat of the conference, we divided the general conference theme 
into four subthemes and asked the main speakers to comment on it. Their 
contributions to this volume are arranged accordingly. The first subtheme is 
embodied religion: a philosophical reflection on mystical experiences and reli-
gious disciplining. In all religious traditions there are numerous examples of 
how religion does not only change the human mind (e.g. through conversion), 
but also affects the human body directly (e.g. various mystical experiences, 
including the so-called stigmata as an extreme example) and indirectly (e.g. 
through the moral and doctrinal teachings of religions, physical disciplining 
etc.). Can philosophy of religion offer (new) anthropological concepts to un-
derstand the corporeal impact of religion? Moreover, do these insights enable 
philosophy of religion to criticise problematic aspects of religious embodi-
ment? In their papers, Jonna Bornemark and Petruschka Schaafsma comment 
on these questions. Bornemark takes a Christian mystic text as her point of 
4 PETER JONKERS & MARCEL SAROT 
 
departure in order to present a phenomenological analysis of sensibility as the 
meeting place between the soul and God. Schaafsma treats the same question 
as Bornemark by turning to the book of Hosea, investigating different motives 
of embodiment in the text. In particular, she explores the body-related no-
tions of ‘dependence’ and ‘discernment.’ 
The second subtheme deals with rituals and sacraments as embodiments 
of God, and asks if this takes us beyond a purely symbolic religion. In all relig-
ions rituals play a crucial role in making the presence of God or the Divine felt 
by humans. In the (Catholic) theology of the Eucharist the real presence of 
God is expressed through the doctrine of the transubstantiation. But other 
sacraments and rituals can also be considered as material expressions of a 
spiritual reality. Can philosophy of religion make sense of these embodiments 
of God and does it influence our view of magical practices? In his paper, Mark 
Wynn starts his answer to these questions by noting some of the ways in 
which human beings can be attuned in bodily terms to place-relative ‘existen-
tial meanings.’ He then extends this case to the religious domain, by examin-
ing the nature of sacred sites and the role of religious concepts in aesthetic 
experience. In his reply to Wynn, Roderich Barth reconstructs religious expe-
rience in the context of a symbol theory that incorporates insights of philo-
sophical anthropology and the contemporary theory of emotion. 
The third subtheme focuses on the issue of neuroscience and free will, and 
asks whether we still can say that we are called to be free. It is aimed at various 
ways to rethink free will in light of recent empirical research that seems to 
imply that decisions are made in the brain before we are aware of them. Do 
these scientific insights present an adequate understanding of the philosophi-
cal concept of the free will, and, if so, can we still say with Paul that we are 
called to be free (Gal. 5:13)? In his contribution to this subtheme, Marcel Sarot 
evaluates neuroscientific experiments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s 
experiments. He argues that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate be-
tween compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will, nor do they 
count against the libertarian conception of free will. In his response paper, 
Aku Visala first argues that the nature of our freedom and what is required for 
are outside the sciences. He then shows that the positive function of neurosci-
ence in this context is to highlight the fact that some of our actions are driven 
by causal factors which we have not previously recognised and which we have 
no control over. 
The final subtheme deals with another aspect of the relation between a 
scientific outlook on the body and its implications for religion. Its title was: 
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Religion, Morality and Being Human: What about ‘Thy will be done’? It is about 
psychobiological and etiological research, suggesting that certain degrees of 
moral consciousness and behaviour are found not only among human beings, 
but also among animals, especially primates. This seems to suggest that mo-
rality is not specifically human. If this insight is true, it obviously challenges 
the idea of human’s unique dignity, which is supported by the religious con-
viction that humans are children of God par excellence. Furthermore, does the 
religious commandment that humans are called upon to do the will of God 
then still make sense? In his paper, Dalferth addresses these questions by fo-
cusing on the concept of human dignity, a controversial concept in contempo-
rary philosophy and policy. From a Kantian and Christian perspective, ‘digni-
ty’ is best understood as an orienting term which which calls attention to the 
humane vs. inhumane way of life to which we commit ourselves when we as-
cribe dignity to others and ourselves. From a Christian point of view, this hu-
mane way of life is a consequence of acknowledging the basic passivity of hu-
man life with respect to what is made possible in and for us through the gift of 
the love of God. In his response, Cottingham argues that the inalienable dig-
nity of all human beings is independent of circumstances, capacities, or quali-
fications. Kantian autonomy (construed as the rational will, or the ability to 
exercise it) cannot ground such a notion. The roots of universal human dig-
nity are more plausibly traced to the Judaeo-Christian worldview in which 
God loves all his children equally, despite their vulnerability and weakness. To 
mature morally is to come to realize that we gain nothing by insisting on our 
status, or ‘standing on our dignity’; we should recognize instead the depend-
ency we share with all our neighbours. 
The final part of this volume consists of a selected number of short-
papers that were presented during the conference by junior as well as senior 
researchers. Besides quality, the main selection criterion was whether the pa-
pers connected to one of the four subthemes. 
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